We used a longitudinal study with 55 middle-and upper middle-class children to investigate the relation between early mother characteristics (e.g. mental state talk, general parenting style) and later child characteristics (e.g. theory of mind, conflict/cooperation). Children were tested once when they were around 3 years and then again around 4 years. At each time point, children were given a task in which mothers helped the child and a friend draw items with a drawing toy. We examined 2 measures of child theory of mind (task performance and mental state talk), and 4 measures of conflict/cooperation. Early mother mental state talk was uniquely related to both later theory of mind measures and 2 of 4 later conflict/cooperation measures. Mother parenting style (warmth) was uniquely related only to 1 later child conflict/cooperation measure. Child theory of mind was not related to any child conflict/cooperation measures. Thus, it seems to be only what mothers say (their mental state talk) that relates to child theory of mind, and both what they say and what they do (their warmth) that relates to child conflict/cooperation.
In this paper, we consider how mother talk about mental states relates to their general parenting style, and to individual differences in children's theory of mind and tendencies to cooperate or be in conflict with their peers. We expand on each of these ideas below.
Theory of mind
There are now a number of studies linking aspects of mothers' parenting, including their talk about mental states, to individual differences in children's theory of mind. Using questionnaires in a cross-sectional study, Ruffman, Perner, and Parkin (1999) found advanced false belief understanding in 3-to 5-year-old children whose mothers claimed they focused on the feelings of the victim when children had transgressed. Pears and Moses (2003) also used questionnaires in a cross-sectional study to measure parents' disciplinary tendencies and found a negative relation between power assertive parenting and 3-to 5-year-olds' belief understanding, but somewhat surprisingly, a positive relation with emotion understanding. A number of longitudinal studies have also found links with mother talk. Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade (1991) found links between observed child-mother talk (child to mother and mother to child) at 33 months of age and the child's affective and belief understanding at 40 months of age. Similarly, Dunn, Brown, and Beardsall (1991) found that observed mother to child and child to mother feeling state talk at 3 years of age correlated with emotion understanding at 6.5 years. Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, and Clark-Carter (1998) found that if mothers described children in mental state terms when children were 37 months of age, children did better on false belief tasks at 49 months of age. Meins and her colleagues found that mothers' appropriate use of mental state language when infants were 6 months of age correlated with advanced theory of mind when children were aged 45 to 48 months (Meins et al., 2002) and 55 months (Meins et al., 2003) .
Another longitudinal study by Ruffman, Slade, and Crowe (2002) involved mothers describing pictures to their children when the children were 3, 3.4 and 4 years of age. Over all three sets of time points (Time 1 to 2, Time 1 to 3 and Time 2 to 3), mothers who used more mental states in their picture descriptions at the earlier time point had children with advanced theory of mind at the later time point. These longitudinal data were consistent with mothers' mental state talk playing a unique and causal role in facilitating children's later theory of mind because mother mental state talk predicted individual differences in theory of mind independent of: (a) children's earlier theory of mind task performance, (b) children's general language abilities, (c) children's own talk about mental states, (d) other types of mother talk (e.g. talk about causes, non-mental state descriptions of the pictures, etc.) and (e) mothers' socio-economic status (education).
Conflict and cooperation
In addition to the evidence linking aspects of parenting to individual differences in theory of mind, there is also evidence linking parenting and parental talk to individual differences in conflict and cooperation. For instance, early mother negativity relates to later child non-compliance (Kochanska, Aksan, & Nichols, 2003; Pettit & Bates, 1989) . Likewise, O'Connor, Deater-Deckard, Fulker, Rutter, and Plomin (1998) found a link between parenting and individual differences in later externalizing in children. A number of studies indicate that talking about feelings or telling children how their actions affect others is associated with children's moral development (Hoffman, 1975; Laible & Thompson, 2000) , leads to a child with a greater inclination to help others in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979) , and leads to a more compliant child (Maccoby & Martin, 1983) .
Typically, researchers argue that other-oriented induction (sometimes operationalized as statements that draw attention to the feelings, thoughts, needs, or intentions of the child, mother, or a third person; Bearison & Cassell, 1975) , leads to compliance because it helps children develop autonomous strategies for controlling their own behaviour. In contrast, power-oriented strategies tend to evoke immediate compliance but not long-term cooperation. One idea is that other-oriented induction does not have a direct effect on conflict/cooperation, but instead facilitates children's theory of mind, which in turn facilitates cooperation. This idea gains credibility from findings indicating that there is a link between advanced theory of mind and various measures of child behaviour associated with better social ability (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995; Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996; Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999 ; although see Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999) .
Thus, to summarize, there are: (a) studies from the parenting style literature indicating that general parenting style and parental talk are linked to conflictual/cooperative behaviour in children, and (b) studies from the theory of mind literature indicating that mother mental state talk facilitates children's theory of mind utterances and performance on theory of mind tasks, which, in turn, are associated with better social ability. However, there is no single study that directly links mother mental state talk to children's theory of mind, and also children's theory of mind to conflictual/cooperative behaviour. The first purpose of the present study was to examine these links. On the one hand, it is possible that mother mental state talk facilitates theory of mind, which in turn results in more cooperation because children understand others' feelings and views better. On the other hand, mother mental state talk might facilitate cooperation directly because it teaches children what is expected. For instance, in a disciplinary situation, talking about someone else's mental states is tantamount to telling children which of their actions are permissible. That is, 'he doesn't like that', 'he thought you wanted one' and 'he didn't know' might equate in a functional sense to 'don't do that'.
Parenting style
A second purpose of the present study was to investigate a variable that could have facilitated children's mental state understanding and been confounded with mother mental state talk in the Ruffman et al. (2002) study. We investigated whether mothers' general parenting style (e.g. warmth, negative affect, responsiveness, teaching attempts, social skill/sensitivity and control level) rather than their mental state talk, facilitated children's theory of mind. For instance, a warm, sensitive parent might also be likely to provide many mental state utterances, but it would be unclear whether it was the warmth/sensitivity or the mental state utterances that facilitated children's theory of mind. It is possible that warm, sensitive parenting (mothers' actions with others) indirectly teaches children about peoples' feelings and perspectives irrespective of what mothers say.
There is little previous research that has addressed whether warm parenting teaches children about feelings independent of mother talk. One finding that bears an indirect relation is that securely attached children tend to do better on theory of mind/emotion tasks (Fonagy, Redfern, & Charman, 1997; Laible & Thompson, 1998; Meins et al., 1998; Ontai & Thompson, 2002; Repacholi & Trapolini, 2004; Steele, Steele, Croft, & Fonagy, 1999; Waters, Rodrigues, & Ridgeway, 1998) . Secure attachment tends to be associated with a warmer and more open and communicative parenting style.
A more direct relation between warm parenting and theory of mind was obtained by Meins et al. (2002) . They rated maternal sensitivity when the infant was 6 months old on a 1 to 9 scale, and found that sensitivity correlated with later theory of mind at 45 to 48 months. Furthermore, the magnitude of the correlation was nearly the same as that between mothers' appropriate mental state talk and later theory of mind. Although mental state talk was the only unique correlate of later theory of mind, it is conceivable that we would find something different, particularly if mother sensitivity and mental state talk were measured closer to the time theory of mind was measured. A second consistent finding was obtained by Hughes, Deater-Deckard, and Cutting (1999) . In a cross-sectional study, they found a moderate positive correlation between mother warmth and children's theory of mind (r ¼ :19), and moderate negative correlations between mother negativity and children's theory of mind (r ¼ 2.18 to 2 .20). Within time point correlations do not shed light on causality, and Hughes et al. did not have a measure of mother mental state talk. Nevertheless, Hughes et al. 's results are consistent with the idea that mother warmth and negativity affect children's theory of mind, and our aim was to determine whether such effects are independent of mother mental state talk.
A related question that we explore herein concerns the extent to which mother warmth (as opposed to mother mental state talk) facilitates children's cooperation. Both are related to aspects of cooperation (see above) so the question is whether they predict independent or shared variance in conflict/cooperation.
General language ability and conflict/cooperation A third purpose was to examine the relation between general language ability and conflict/cooperation. Language is a consistent correlate of children's theory of mind (e.g. Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Cheung et al., 2004; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Farrar & Maag, 2002; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003; Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Smith, Apperly, & White, 2003) . In addition, Cassidy et al. (2003) found that language was a higher correlate of prosocial behaviour than was theory of mind, and that language carried many of the relations between theory of mind and prosocial behaviour. Cassidy et al. suggest this might be because prosocial behaviour is often expressed through language, because their language measure had many more items (33 to 60) than the theory of mind measure (0 to 8) or because the cooperation and attentiveness needed to do well on the language measure were also needed for a high prosocial score.
Present study
We examined the issues outlined above by using children and data from two time points in the Ruffman et al. (2002) study; when the mean age of children was 3 years and then again 1 year later. Thus, our Time 1 is the same as that of Ruffman et al., although our Time 2 is their Time 3. At each time point, we used data from Ruffman et al. 's picture task in which mothers described pictures to their child, giving a measure of mother and child mental state talk. In addition, we examined a new task, the drawing task, not described by Ruffman et al., in which mothers helped their child and the child's friend draw two figures (a square and a triangle) on an Etch-a-Sketch toy. Each child grasped a dial. One dial moved the line upward or downward, and the second dial moved the line side-to-side. This meant that the two children needed to work together to draw each figure, helping to provide a measure of the child's conflict and cooperation with the friend. We videotaped these sessions and obtained three measures of children's cooperative behaviour with the friend, and six measures of mothers' general style (positive affect, negative affect, responsiveness, social skill, teaching, control level). Similar ratings scales have been used in previous research (e.g. Deater-Deckard, 2000) . In addition, we obtained a general measure of conflict/cooperation by asking mothers how many naughty acts their child engaged in at each time point.
Our measures of parenting style were based on a meta-analysis by Rothbaum and Weisz (1994) . They identified six parental characteristics that they then examined for effects on children. These were approval (warmth), guidance (teaching/scaffolding), motivational strategies (positive reinforcement), coercion (punishment), synchrony (sensitivity) and restrictiveness (rule setting). Their meta-analysis of 47 prior studies indicated that all factors except restrictiveness were correlated significantly in the expected direction with externalizing in children.
In addition, we examined other measures from the Ruffman et al. (2002) study. In previous research, theory of mind has been operationalized using both mental state talk (e.g. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983 ) and task performance. Thus, to examine children's theory of mind, we used both their task performance and their mental state talk. This left us with eight measures for children, including age, language ability, theory of mind task performance, theory of mind talk, and four measures of child conflict/cooperation (mother-rated naughty incidents, observed child continued conversation with the friend during the drawing task, observed child working together with the friend during the drawing task and observed child arguing/tussling with the friend over the drawing toy). In addition, there were eight measures for mothers including mental state talk and education and the six measures of general style (positive affect, negative affect, responsiveness, social skill, teaching, control level).
Method
Participants There were 55 children at each time point (23 girls, 22 boys), although numbers dropped slightly for some tasks. The mean ages and ranges are included in Table 1 . Mothers of the children responded to advertisements in newspapers, parent group newsletters and a parenting magazine, and were paid £40 for completing the study. Children were white and were from middle-and upper-middle-class rural and urban areas in the United Kingdom. The friend who participated with the child on the drawing task was approximately the same age as the child and was classified by mothers as 'a good friend'. The same friend generally participated at both time points unless the target child was no longer a close associate of that child (five children).
Materials and procedure

Drawing task
This task was given at both time points. Children were given a drawing toy with two dials. One dial moved the cursor up or down, and the second dial moved it left or right. The child held one dial and the child's friend held the other dial. Mothers were instructed to help the children draw: (a) a square, then (b) a triangle. Mothers were given free reign to be as instructive or uninstructive as they pleased and the task typically lasted about 10 minutes. Interventions were coded from the videotapes.
On the basis of the drawing task, mothers were rated for their general style and the target child was rated for conflict/cooperation with the friend. Deater-Deckard (2000) used a 1 to 7 rating scale to measure child negative affect, non-compliance with mother, responsiveness to mother and persistence on task. We used a 0 to 10 scale to enhance measurement sensitivity if possible, and used similar though in some cases slightly different child behaviour scales on the basis of previous findings. These included: (a) children's willingness to engage in conversation with the friend and the 'connectedness' of their dialogue (i.e. the extent to which conversation continued on a shared theme between children; Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996) , (b) the extent of conflict (arguing and tussling over toy) and (c) the extent to which children worked together (i.e. cooperated) with the friend on the drawing task.
Using the videotapes and transcriptions, one coder rated all mothers and children using an 11-point Likert scale (0 to 10) based on the coder's overall impression after watching all of the drawing task. A second coder rated 25% of the mothers and children. Coders gave mothers an overall rating after observing the whole of the Etch-a-Sketch task. To be counted as an agreement, raters had to be within 1 point of one another. Inter-rater agreement, taken over both mothers and children, was high. Of the 357 ratings at Time 1, 354 (99%) were within 1 point. Likewise, of the 357 ratings at Time 2, 351 (98%) were within 1 point. The primary coder's rating was always used in case of differences.
Picture task
This task was used by Ruffman et al. (2002) . At Time 1, mothers were given 10 photographs of people involved in common situations (e.g. a woman bathing a baby, a girl playing on a climbing frame, a man and a girl at the beach). Mothers were given the photos and the experimenter said, 'Can you look at these pictures with (child's name), like you would with, say, a book at bedtime or pictures in a magazine?' The dialogue Coders worked from the written transcriptions but used the audiotapes to disambiguate utterances as needed. Typically, mothers described the pictures to children for about 10 minutes. Mental state talk was based largely on the criteria of Bartsch and Wellman (1995) , and included the cognitive terms think and know (e.g. 'they're thinking hard', 'I think it's a cat', 'why do you think that?', 'I think it's lovely', 'I don't know what it is'), but not 'I know' or 'I don't know' because of their probable use meaning simply, 'I can or can't answer' (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983) . Other mental state expressions referred to desires (e.g. want, like, love, dream, hope, wish, prefer, keen on), to emotions (happy, sad, unhappy, feel, cross, angry, grumpy, scared, afraid, disappointed, worried, upset, surprised, pleased, enjoy, excited, fun, interested, frustrated, missed, annoyed, hurtful, bored and fed up), general mental states (remember, understand, forget, remind, realize, idea, consider, have in mind, day-dream, dream, mean, imagine, wonder and expect) and modulations of assertions (e.g. might, maybe, perhaps, possibly, probably, could be, must, certainly, definitely, sure, guess, figure, reckon, certain, suppose, wonder, expect, curious and bet).
Utterances that included a mental state expression, but in which the mother or child repeated herself with no codeable intervening utterance, were not coded as mental state utterances. Utterances in which the mother repeated the child (or vice versa) with no change in content, were likewise not coded as mental state utterances. Originally, coders coded each of the types of mental state talk (think/know, desire, emotion, modulations of assertion, other mental state terms) separately. Kappas for each category were all high and were between .90 and .96. A composite variable comprising all categories was then used in Ruffman et al. 's (2002) and our analyses.
Language
The language test given at both time points was the linguistic concepts subtest of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals -Preschool Test (CELF; Wiig, Secord, & Semel, 1992) . Examples of items are provided in Ruffman et al. (2002) .
Theory of mind
The false belief transfer task given at both time points was based on Wimmer and Perner (1983) , the desire-emotion task was based on Wellman and Woolley (1990) and the 1 Ruffman et al. (2002) used three time points: Time 1 (mean age ¼ 3.0, our Time 1), Time 2 (mean age ¼ 3.4) and Time 3 (mean age ¼ 4.0, our Time 2). The set of 10 pictures was used at Time 1, and the set of 13 pictures was used at Times 2 and 3. The correlations between mother mental state utterances at Times 1 and 2, r ¼ :74, and Times 1 and 3, r ¼ :61 (when different pictures were used) were in the same range as the correlation at Times 2 and 3, r ¼ :61 (when the same pictures were used). This consistency over time points indicates there is no reason to think that picture set affected the tendency of mothers to give few or many mental state utterances.
emotion-situations task was based on Denham (1986) . In the false belief transfer task, a story character, Katy, placed a cake (play-dough) in a red box and left. A second character, Sam, found the cake, ate some and placed the remainder in a green box. Katy woke up and returned and the child was asked the belief question ('where will Katy look first?'), and three memory questions (beginning: 'where was the cake in the beginning?', now: 'where is the cake now?' and watch: 'did Katy watch when Sam moved the cake?'). To be counted as correct on the belief question, the child had to answer the three memory questions correctly. At Time 1, only children aged 3 years and above were given the false belief transfer task under the assumption that 2-year-olds would fail.
There were two versions of the desire-emotion task. In both versions, children were told that the story character (David) liked one thing (e.g. horses) but not something else (e.g. cows). Children were then asked memory questions about what David likes, and if they failed, David's preferences were re-stated and the child was asked the memory question again. If children failed a memory question twice, they were counted as failing the task. Then, David looked in one location and either found a horse or a cow and the child was asked, 'How does David feel. Does he feel happy or does he feel sad?' Finally, the child was again asked the memory questions about David's preferences (with the same procedure following incorrect answers), David searched in a second location and found the remaining animal, and the child was again asked about his emotion. Children were scored as correct only if they were right on both emotion questions (as well as the memory questions).
For the emotion-situations task, the child was shown four different emotion faces (happy, sad, scared and angry), and was asked to identify each. The experimenter corrected the child if necessary, and then demonstrated the procedure by placing the frightened face on a girl who was in a stereotypically frightening situation (confronted with a spider). The child was then given 14 stereotypical situations in a fixed order (see Ruffman et al., 2002, for details) . All situations were illustrated with line drawings, and the experimenter pointed to the protagonists in turn and to the relevant action (if appropriate). For each situation, the child was asked, 'How does (name of character) feel? Put a face on her to show how she feels'. This task was initially given to 22 adults. Based on these ratings, for eight situations, we accepted either or both of two emotions as correct because adults had named either emotion (see Ruffman et al., 2002) .
The Time 2 desire-action task was based on Wellman and Bartsch (1988) . In each of the two versions, a story character (Billy) wanted something (e.g. string) to take to a particular location (e.g. his nursery). The experimenter told the child that the string was either in a box or in a bag. Billy looked in the box and either found the string or found nothing. The child was then asked an action question ('what does Billy do after he finds/doesn't find some string. Does he look in the bag or does he go to his nursery?'), the want question ('what did Billy want?') and the find question ('what did Billy find?'). The want and find questions were control questions. To be scored as correct on the desire-action task, the child had to correctly answer all control questions and both action questions (when Billy found the string and when he found nothing).
The false belief contents task given at Time 2 was based on Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) . In this task, the experimenter introduced a doll (Julie) but then hid her in a bag. The experimenter then asked the child to say what was in a crayons box, showed that there was a key inside instead of crayons, checked whether the child remembered what was inside, retrieved Julie and reminded the child she had not seen inside and then asked the child the 'other' question, 'When we first show Julie this box, before she looks inside, what will she say is in here?' (giving a forced choice if there was no answer). If children initially failed to acknowledge that there was a key in the box, the experimenter repeated the process of showing them what was inside. Children were also asked a 'self' question: 'when I first showed you the box, all closed up like this, what did you think was in there then?' Children were counted as failing both the 'other' and 'self' questions if they were incorrect two times on the 'what's in here?' question after revealing the pencil and closing the box.
Children were also asked a justification question for the contents 'other' question ('why will she think there are crayons inside?'). Children who referred to the story character's lack of knowledge (e.g. 'because her doesn't know') were given 0.5 of a point for their justification. Children who referred to the box's misleading appearance were given 1 point (e.g. 'because it's got a picture of crayons'). Likewise, at Time 2, children were asked a justification question for the false belief translocation task ('why will Katy look there?'). Children who referred to where the story character originally put the cake, to her thinking it had not moved or to the character's lack of visual access were given 1 point (e.g. 'because that's where she put it', 'because she thinks it didn't move away', ''cuz she didn't see him'). One child who said 'because her doesn't know' was given 0.5 of a point on the assumption that the child meant the character did not know about the object's transfer.
The Time 2 wicked desires task was based on Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, and van den Ende (1996) . A story character tried to throw a ball at a second character because he did not like him. In one story, the second character caught the ball, and in the other story, the ball hit the character. We then asked the child the test question, 'How does the orange boy feel about that: happy or sad?' Next, we asked the child two control questions: what the first character had wanted to do in the beginning, and why he wanted to do that (in forced-choice format if necessary: 'did he like the green boy?'). Stories were illustrated by line drawings and children were scored as correct if they answered both control questions correctly and said the thrower would feel happy when he hit the second character and sad when he missed. This is the pattern that Yuill et al. found 5-year-olds, but not 3-and 4-year-olds showed. The Time 2 ambiguity task was based on Taylor (1988) . Children were shown line drawings of two objects: first, a flower and a rabbit, then, an elephant and a giraffe. Each of the two objects was covered leaving only a small but visible bit that, in the first case, made the flower and rabbit indistinguishable, and, in the second case, made it possible still to identify the elephant and giraffe. The child was then asked whether a doll, which had not seen the full pictures, would know what each one was, 'Does Mary know which one is the rabbit/elephant?' To be correct, the child needed to pass both the ambiguous and the unambiguous condition.
At Time 1, the 14 emotion-situation scenarios were scored as a proportion (out of one) and summed along with the false belief transfer task (1 point) and the desireemotion task (1 point) for a total of 3 points. At Time 2, the maximum theory of mind score was 8 points (2 points for the transfer task, 3 for the contents task and 1 each for the ambiguity, wicked desires, and desire-action tasks).
Education
Mothers' education was coded on a 7-point scale as a measure of socio-economic status. Descriptions of this scoring with approximate North American equivalents are as follows: 0: dropped out before age 16, 1: Certificate of Secondary Education (high school up to age 16 with a focus on applied topics), 2: General Certificate of Secondary Education or O-Levels (high school up to age 16 with an academic focus), 3: A-Levels (high school up to age 18 with an academic focus), 4: professional school (e.g. nursing, architecture), 5: university under-graduate, 6: university postgraduate.
Mother-rated naughtiness
At each time point, we asked mothers to rate the number of mild and serious naughty acts carried out by their child on a good day and a bad day, and how many good and bad days per week there were. Mild and serious were not defined for mothers because a given act (e.g. teasing another) could easily fit into either category depending on its severity. However, after mothers had rated children's naughtiness, we asked them to define what they meant by mild and serious, and there was good agreement between mothers as to the kinds of acts that characterized each category. Serious acts generally involved hurting another person (e.g. hitting, kicking), causing damage to property (e.g. drawing on walls, breaking a glass door) or doing something dangerous (e.g. running into the road). Mild acts generally involved not cooperating (e.g. not getting dressed, playing with something banned, not eating, being rude, shouting, etc.). At Time 1, 43 mothers completed these ratings and at Time 2, 54 did so.
Design
At Time 1, tasks were given in a semi-random order as follows: the language test, one or more theory of mind tasks, the picture task and any remaining theory of mind tasks. The drawing task was then given 1 week later. At Time 2, tasks were given in the same order as above but in a single session.
Results Table 1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the child and mother variables. The different theory of mind tasks tended to correlate well with each other at each time point. Of the 13 possible within time point correlations between different theory of mind tasks, 12 were significant. This helps to justify using a theory of mind composite score at each time point. Table 2 lists the correlations between each of the child measures over both time points. The two theory of mind measures (child mental state talk and child theory of mind task performance) correlated within and across time points (4 of 4 significant correlations). These correlations also help to justify task performance and mental state talk as measures of theory of mind.
Likewise, the three measures of observed conflict/cooperation all correlated with mothers' ratings of children's naughtiness within each time point (6 of 6 correlations; see Table 2 ). These findings help validate both mother naughtiness estimates and drawing task ratings (i.e. the more naughty incidents mothers said children were involved in each week, the lower children's observed levels of conflict and the higher their cooperation). They demonstrate, for instance, that observations of cooperation during the drawing task were not simply a function of the particular friend the child played with or the particular day the child was tested on. In contrast, there were no significant correlations between gender and any of the variables listed in Table 1 so that gender was not considered further in the analyses. Table 3 lists the correlations between  mother variables, and Table 4 lists the correlations between Time 1 mother variables and Time 2 child variables. 
Predictors of later theory of mind
We used regression to examine whether mother mental state talk was a significant predictor of later child theory of mind, having accounted for mothers' parenting style. All variables that were significant correlates of later child theory of mind task performance (see Tables 2 and 4) were entered in the first step as predictors, including mother education, Time 1 mother mental state talk, Time 1 child age, Time 1 child general language and Time 1 theory of mind task performance. In this case, none of the parenting style measures were significant and hence were not entered. With all variables in the prediction equation, two were significant predictors of Time 2 theory of mind task performance: Time 1 general language, tð48Þ ¼ 2:75, p , :01, b ¼ 0:37, and mother mental state talk, tð48Þ ¼ 1:99, p ¼ :05, b ¼ 0:28. Similarly, Time 1 mother education, mental state talk, responsiveness, social skill, teaching and control level (see Table 3 ) and child age and Time 1 child mental state talk were entered in the first step of a regression predicting Time 2 child mental state talk. With all variables in the prediction equation, only Time 1 mother mental state talk was a significant predictor, tð47Þ ¼ 3:37, p , . 
Predictors of later child conflict/cooperation
Including marginal correlations, Time 1 mother mental state talk correlated with all four measures of child conflict/cooperation at Time 2, being associated with more child conversation and working together with the friend, and with less arguing/tussling and a lower naughty rating (see Table 4 ). Time 1 mother warmth correlated with two measures of child conflict/cooperation at Time 2, and Time 1 mother responsiveness correlated with one such measure. We used linear regression to determine whether any of the significant variables listed in Table 4 predicted unique variance in child cooperation/conflict (see Table 5 ). For this purpose, all of the significant correlates listed in Table 4 were entered in different orders into the prediction equation for each of the dependent variables (Time 2 child characteristics) listed in Table 5 . The analyses were cross-lagged in that for each Time 2 child characteristic, the Time 1 equivalent was entered in the first step in the regression. For instance, with Time 2 child-friend conversation as the dependent variable, in one model, Time 1 child-friend conversation and Time 1 mother mental state talk were entered first, and Time 1 mother warmth was entered in the second step. In the second model, Time 1 child-friend conversation and mother warmth were entered first, and then Time 1 mother mental state talk. The values of pr, t, p and b listed in Table 5 are based on the first (and final) step (i.e. all predictors in the prediction equation). Mother mental state talk was a unique predictor of two of four cooperation variables, and mother warmth was a unique predictor of one such variable. Time 1 mother rating of children's naughtiness was the only unique predictor of her Time 2 rating of children's naughtiness.
Discussion Ruffman et al. (2002) found that mother mental state talk was related to later theory of mind understanding independent of maternal education, other kinds of mother talk, children's earlier theory of mind and their earlier general language and specific talk about mental states. The first aim of this study was to examine whether the link between maternal mental state talk and individual differences in children's theory of mind was also independent of mothers' general parenting style. Recall, for instance, that Hughes et al. (1999) found that mother warmth and negativity related to children's theory of mind within a time point. Further, in a longitudinal study, Meins et al. (2002) found that maternal sensitivity at 6 months correlated with theory of mind at 45 to 48 months. Although maternal sensitivity was not a unique predictor of child theory of mind, it is possible that a measure of maternal warmth closer to the time at which theory of mind is measured might be. We examined this idea at two time points; when the children's mean age was 3 years and then again at 4 years. Our findings were clear. Some of the Time 1 parenting style measures correlated with later child theory of mind, but only Time 1 mother mental state talk explained unique variance in children's later theory of mind.
The second aim was to examine two potential models of development. First, mother mental state talk might facilitate children's theory of mind, which, in turn, leads to a more cooperative and less conflictual child (because the child understands others' feelings and views better). As stated at the outset, other-oriented induction is known to relate to moral development, empathy and compliance, and such induction is sometimes operationalized as statements that draw attention to the feelings, thoughts, needs or intentions of the child, mother or a third person. Thus, focusing on others' thoughts and feelings might facilitate children's theory of mind, which leads to a more cooperative child. This model is also consistent with findings discussed at the outset that We found no relation between either theory of mind measure and any of the four measures of child conflict/cooperation. That is, of the eight potential correlations, not one approached significance. In contrast, mother mental state talk was related to all four measures of child cooperation and was uniquely related to two such measures. In addition, mother warmth was uniquely related to one measure of child cooperation. These results are clearly consistent with the second model, that is, that maternal mental state talk and maternal warmth have a direct effect on child cooperation. This is the first study to include all four measures (mother mental state talk, mother warmth, child theory of mind and child cooperation), and thus is the first to directly test these two models.
Our finding of some relation between early parenting style and later child behaviour is consistent with that reported by Rothbaum and Weisz (1994) in their meta-analysis of prior studies. It is conceivable even that our findings underestimate the effects for both parenting style and mother mental state talk. This is, first, because many of the studies summarized by Rothbaum and Weisz extended over several years and the trends were in the direction of stronger parenting effects over longer periods, presumably because consistent parenting practice over many years has a cumulative effect. Our study extended over 1 year so that there may not have been sufficient time for parenting practices (style or talk) to have a major effect on children. Nevertheless, what is clear is that within our time frame (3 to 4 years), there was a clear effect of mother mental state talk on theory of mind, and no effect for general parenting style.
In addition, our results may be particularly representative of one segment of society. Our mothers were volunteers from middle-to upper middle-class backgrounds. Their ratings on the general style measures tended to be towards the optimal end of the scale. It is possible that effects for general parenting style would be stronger if less optimal parenting styles were more prevalent. For instance, many of the studies reviewed by Rothbaum and Weisz (1994) involved more extreme socio-economic backgrounds and parents who were not always as warm and responsive as our parents. Again, however, what is clear is that within these relatively advantaged families there are clear effects for mother mental state talk on children's theory of mind and cooperation, but an effect for mothers' general style only on children's cooperation.
A third purpose was to examine Cassidy et al. 's (2003) finding that children's general language abilities were a better predictor of cooperation than their theory of mind. In our study, we found inconsistent evidence for this idea. Of the 16 potential correlations, language was related weakly, but in the expected direction, with less arguing/tussling in children at Time 1, but it was related in the opposite direction with more (mother-rated) acts of severe naughtiness at Time 2. Cassidy et al. found that the clearest link between language and child behaviour was for teacher ratings of social skills, accounting for 13% to 17% of the unique variance. It seems likely that teachers use children's language as central to their ratings of social competence and this is not surprising since social communication depends on a certain level of linguistic ability. In addition, although in Cassidy et al., language did not account for unique variance in observed prosocial acts or child popularity amongst peers, it did account for 5% to 6% of the unique variance on a composite measure comprising: (a) observed positive interactions, (b) social awareness, (c) popularity and (d) social competence. This composite measure of social behaviour bears some resemblance to our observed measures of cooperation. Nevertheless, the differences between Cassidy et al. 's very general measure of observed child behaviour and our more specific measure of observed cooperation may have contributed to the discrepancy in findings. In addition, their language measure was simply more extensive than ours in that their mean score was 51.89 whereas our mean score at Time 1 was 9.01. With such a large number of items, Cassidy et al. 's language measure was likely to be a more sensitive measure of child ability.
Importantly, however, our results agree in some ways with those of Cassidy et al. (2003) in that theory of mind was not related to various aspects of social behaviour. The only measures where theory of mind or affective understanding accounted for unique variance in Cassidy et al. were peer ratings of likeability and children's tendency to receive prosocial acts from peers. Again, theory of mind was not uniquely related to Cassidy et al. 's general measure of observed child behaviour. It might be, then, that theory of mind has a relatively specific or weak effect on children's behaviour. It leads to more protracted social interactions (Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996) , and it sometimes leads to higher ratings of social skill from teachers (Lalonde & Chandler, 1995; Watson et al., 1999; although not in Cassidy et al.) . Beyond this, theory of mind, at least as tapped by traditional tasks, may not have much impact on children's social behaviour.
In our study, measures of cooperation employed both observations of children and mother ratings. Each type of measure has strengths and weaknesses. Observations provide relatively objective indices of what the child actually does, but capture behaviour in a restricted range of situations. They are potentially subject to day-to-day differences in children's and mothers' moods, as well as the idiosyncrasies of particular friends and the tasks children are given. Mother ratings are potentially subject to reporting biases, but capture behaviour over a larger time frame and range of situations. Despite the potential shortcomings of both types of measure, there was evidence for each being a valid index. Mothers' ratings of naughtiness were related to reduced levels of observed child cooperation at and across time points. This indicates that despite their potential shortcomings, the measures were not misleading indices of cooperation.
It is important to recognize that observed child cooperation and conflict were rated in a social context with a friend. Clearly, dynamics between different pairs of children will not always be the same, and this raises the question of how representative our results are. Two of our findings help alleviate this concern. First, as noted above, mothers' ratings of naughtiness correlated with observed child cooperation and conflict with the friend in the expected direction at both time points. Second, mother mental state talk correlated with mother-rated naughtiness in addition to observed cooperation/conflict. This consistency in findings makes us think that observed cooperation with the friend is a valid index of children's behaviour.
In sum, this study includes longitudinal data consistent with the idea that mother mental state talk facilitates children's later theory of mind and cooperation, and that maternal warmth also facilitates later child cooperation. There was no relation between general parenting style and later theory of mind, and no relation between theory of mind and later cooperation. Our data are not consistent with the idea that maternal warmth rather than mental state talk facilitates children's later theory of mind. Nor are our data consistent with the idea that mother mental state talk facilitates theory of mind, which then leads to more cooperation. Instead, our data are consistent with the idea that mother mental state talk and warmth directly facilitate cooperation in children. By focusing on peoples' feelings and perspectives, mothers might teach children that other persons are important and should be treated well. Ultimately, to provide further evidence for these claims, future researchers might train mothers to use mental state language and act warmly, and observe later theory of mind and cooperation.
